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LAISSEZ-FAIRE TO NATIONAL PLANNING:
The Editorial Poliey of the Beaumont Enterprise from the Great
Crash through the Hundred Daysl
PAUL E. ISSAC
"The country is sound economically, and, so far as anyone can see, will
remain so indefinitely,"2 This statement in a Beaumont Enterprise edi-
torial on February 12, 1930, summed up the paper's initial I'eaction to .the
economic difficulties set off by the stock market crash of 1929. When the
panic first occurred in October, the Enterprise saw in the collapse of stock
values merely the logical outcome of wild speculation which was "almost
as remote from the steady throb of American industry, the orderly move-
ment of commerce and the normal flow of business as a roulette wheel
hidden away in some gilded gambling establishment is I'emote from the
business life of an American city." The ruin of speculators would not af-
fect solid citizens who had invested wisely. "Good stock," the editor pro-
claimed, "is still good stock."1 The En~e was confident that the
measures being taken by President Hoover and business leaders would be
"more than su1Bcient" to deal with the relatively remote possibility of a
serious depression.· At the end of December 1929, the Enterprise had a
cheerful word for its readers: The nation's prosperity was not destroyed
by the deflation of security values. The fear of financial collapse in 1930
was groundless, because the country's economic system was "sound to the
core." "The American people may look forward to the new yeaI' with
utmost confidence, since there is no factor at present discernible
that might cause economic disaster."~ Ludicrous as these editorial com-
ments seem in 1965, they were quite in line with statements made early in
1930 by the President of the United States, prominent industrialists, bank-
ers, professional economists, and other financial experts. Not many people,
even after the crash, foresaw the disastrous event! of the next few years,
Enterprise editolials first began to manifest some real concern during
the latter part of February 1930, particularly over the growing number of
people without work.8 The paper urged Congress to enact Hoover's public
works measures, and even criticized the President for not doing more to
help the unemployed. Though insisting that the permanent solution to
the unemployment situation lay in the hands of businessmen rather than
politicians, the Enterprise by mid-1930 was calling for legislative relief.'
It also took the Enterprise some time to I'ecognize the effect of the de-
pression on Beaumont. In mid-February 1930, an editorial predicted a
prosperous year for the city-a new court house was going up, port fa-
cilities were being improved, a bond issue had been voted for street work,
the oil industry was spending millions, the Kansas City Southern Railroad
was planning to build a new terminal, and several large buildings were go-
ing to be erected.8 In May, the editor admitted "some depression" had
teen felt in Beaumont but found the city fortunate in having escaped the
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worst effects of the bUlliness decline.9 The situation was less favorable in
November, when during the community chest campaign the editor stated:
"An emergency need exists in Beaumont. There is not as much suffering
here, or as much unemployment, as there is in other cities, but quite enough
to warrant the charitable people of Beaumont in straining a point to make
their community chest subscriptions as large as possible."Io Still no panic,
but certainly recognition that 1930 had not turned out to be a banner year.
The Enterprise was finally aware of the existence of a serious depres-
~ion, yet it continued to expect recovery in the near future. As early as
January 1930, the editor saw signs of economic revivaI.ll In September,
be said the nation was slowly recovering and thought that slow recovery
was sounder than rapid.I~ On January 6, 1932, the Enterprise admitted
that previous predictions of recovery had been wrong, found "almost uni-
versal agreement" that the decline would be halted that year. "There
ill a limit to all periods of depression."13 As late as June 2, 1932, the En-
terprise declared: "The 'richest nation on earth' has not been reduced to
bankruptcy in three years. The actual wealth it possessed three years ago
is still in existence. Confidence, more than any other factor, will restore
prosperity."u
The Enterprise did not devote much space to philosophizing on the causes
of the depression. Over the nation, there were those who agreed with
President Hoover that economic dislocation in Europe was the fundamen-
tal cause of the depression, and others who blamed the collapse on deep
rottenness within the American economy. In many of its editorials the
Enterprise alluded to the soundness of the American system but in one on
May 8, 1981, it seemed to side with those who thought there was something
fundamentally wrong. "Even to a pet:son of ordinary intelligence who is
not an expert economist, a financier or an industrial leader, it is evident
that there is something wrong with the American industrial system, what-
ever may be said of conditions abi'Oad which injuriously affect that sys-
tem."15 It should be noted that this comment was not typical of the
Enterprise's attitude toward the economic system, at least until the elec-
'inn campaign of 1982.
In numerous editorials before the emergence of the New Deal the Enter-
jn'ise praised the free enterprise system while it deplored the growth of
the federal bureaucracy, the suppression of the pioneer spirit by paternal-
ism, and the drift toward state socialism under President Hoover. '8 In
view of subsequent events, it is interesting that these charges against the
Hoover administration were frequently made in the Democratic Press all
over the nation. The Enterpri.~e blamed industry itself for the increasing
domination of business by government. "There was a time in this country
when industrial leaders, financiers and businessmen of all kinds had self
reliance." But lately businessmen had been running to Washington for
helpY The oil companies, for example, were clamoring for legislative
a.ction to stop overproduction of petroleum when they ought to curtail out-
put by agreement among themselves. Despite its praise of the free enter-
prise system, the Entet"pf'ise thought the oil ::ompanies ought to be allowed
to make price and production agreements instead of being threatened "with
the club of an antiquated anti-trust law."18 After the establishment of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the Enterprise favored a strict
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loan policy to prevent habitual dependence upon the government for finan-
cial assistance. Prosperity would return only when people tried to solve
their "problems according to the time-tried formulas" that business had
always relied upon.19 "The sooner the American people regain their old
independent spirit, no matter how great the sacrifices they have to make,
the better it will be for them and their country."20
The Enterprise also condemned governmental regulation of agriculture,
particularly any attempt to limit cotton acreage by law. Several editorials
opposed efforts in the state legislature in 1931 to restrict cotton planting.
Such measures would interfere with the right of the citizen to do what he
pleased with his property. The mere suggestion by the Federal Farm
Board that farmers plow up every third row of cotton aroused the editor's
ire, as did a plan for federal subsidization of farm exports.21 When Huey
P. Long called upon Southern farmers to plant no cotton at all in 1932, ,
the Enterprise thought the proposal would do more harm than good. The
fate of the cotton industry, it said, l'ested in the hands of the farmers,
not with "lawmakers, ballyhoo artists, candidates for public office and poli-
ticians, "22 The cotton problem was purely economic; bankers and producers
could deal with it, but "the human race has learned by costly experience
that the less lawmaking bodies and politicians have to do with a nation's
~conomic questions the better off that nation is."23 In May 1932, the
Enterprise expressed doubt that the passage of the McNary-Haugen bill
would really solve the agricultural problem. "For years Congress has been
tinkering with the farm industry, and that industry is worse off today
than it has ever been before." Farmers, like businessmen, could do more
by getting together and working out their own solutions than by depending
upon Washington.24
Through the summer of 1931, the Enterprise opposed federal aid, espe-
cially the dole, for relief of the unemployed.u The idea that "federal tax.
payers contribute to the support of all the rest of the population, the
greater part of which pays no federal taxes-is injurious in many ways.
It weakens the morale of a people who have always felt heretofore that
they could take care of themselves." The government could furnish some
help "but in heaven's name let us fight the paternalism that is sapping
the energy and destroying the initiative of the American people, dipping
C'ur hands into the federal treasury only as a last resort, when all other ex-
pedients fail !"26 The United States should try everything else before it
adopted the English dole. Ambition died in idle men supported by the gov.
ernment.2'
The Enterprise modified its stand on federal relief much earlier than
;t admitted the need for government aid to business and agriculture. By
the fall of 1931, it wanted "assurance that the nation will have a prac-
ticable system for co-ordinating federal, state and municipal aid in readi-
ness before the winter arrives." If the dole were t.o be avoided, many
millions were required immediately to finance public works "to keep the
wheels of productive industry turning and provide work for all who need
work."28 As the winter of 1931-1932 brought great. suffering to the grow-
ing number of unemployed, the Enterprise said that if local relief meas-
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ures were inadequate the nation must turn to direct federal relief, even
the hated dole.29
In 1932, the Enterprise attacked the Hoover Administration for aiding
the corporations but neglecting the hungry masses. "The 'dole' has few
defenders, in principle, but starvation doel.l not permit of hair-splitting dis-
tinctions-that is, it does not permit them to be long continued, for men
may become desperate under the lash of hunger." Although the Hoover
Administration persisted in its claim that local and private agencies were
able to handle the relief problem, the Enterprise declared it had been
"demonstrated that every community cannot solve its relief and welfare
problems." The federal government must act.so
The unemployment situation, much more than the plight of business
and agriculture, brought the Enterprise to the point of questioning somp.
traditional American cliches about government aid and indh;dualism. An
editorial on November 23, 1932, said Americans were asking, "What does
it profit a man to enjoy the blessings of liberty if he is denied a job?" In
a pinch a man could live without political liberty, but he had to have food
and shelter. American politicians had long been preoccupied with liberty,
while an industrial system arose "that is now unable to provide millions
of good American citizens with something even more valuable than liberty."
Widespread unemployment which resulted in breakdown, both physical and
moral, created the worst social conditions possible. "Every man and
woman should have the right to earn his or her own livelihood. The world
may not owe every man a living, but it owes him a job."31
In the early days of the depression the Enterprise defended the right of
the unemployed to demonstrate peacefully and warned that police attacks
on hunger marches would make converts for Bolshevism.32 When a size-
able group from Beaumont left to join the veteran's bonus march on Wash-
ington in 1932, the Enterprise declared that these men had the "right of
appeal," but added that it would be unfortunate if radicals infiltrated the
marchers and caused disorder. 33 The editor did not think the Hoover Ad-
ministration's use of troops against the veterans was necessary, though he
did concede that it was difficult to know exactly what had happened.St
During another bonus march on Washington in 1933, the Enterprise
praised the Roosevelt Administration for avoiding a dangerous crisis by
giving the veterans a friendly reception-instead of troops, Mrs. Roosevelt
was sent to greet them.35
The Enterprise was not harshly critical of the Hoover Administration,
except perhaps on the unemployment question, until the election year of
1932. A supporter of Smith in 1928, it had condemned some of Hoover's
actions, including the signing of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, but it had also
expressed confidence in his leadership during the early days of the de-
pression.S6 At the time of the Republican National Convention in June
1932, the Enterprise had some kind words for the President, but concluded
"m'ore in son'ow ~hari anger" that Hoover had "failed to meet the test of
a great national emergency."81 Ironically, one of the chief complaints the
Enterprise had against the champion of rugged individualism was that
during his administration "centralization of authority in Washington" had
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gone to "almost unbelievable extremes." "The federal government meddles
in private business and engages in private business on a vast scale. Bu-
reaucracy has had a mushroom growth which the feeble efforts of Congress
have done little or nothing to stay."38 The Enterprise did not blame
Hoover for the depression but found "that after the emergency arose he
did not act with the promptness and decision expected of him, that he
$eemed unwilling to believe the situation was as bad as it really was and
such leadership as he showed was ineffective."s9 It would seem that the
Enterprise expected Hoover to end the depression by some miracle which
did not involve increasing the government's role in economic life.
The Enterprise did not back Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Democratic
nomination in 1932; it thought Garner could "probably win more votes
than the somewhat colorless" governor of New York.·o Once FDR was
nominated, the paper supported him and denounced the "absurdity" of the
Republican charge that he was a radical or a "bolshevik."tI One editorial
praised Roosevelt's farm proposals for their conservatism. They would
lighten the farmer's tax burdens, refinance his mortgages, and give tariff
protection to his products, without making any more "raids on the federal
treasury" or "plunging t.he federal government further into private busi-
ness."42
It took the Enterprise several weeks to walm up to Roosevelt as a
campaigner and to accept some of the implicat.ions of his program. On
September 20, 1932, the editor wrote rather condescendingly of FDR as "a
gentleman with a gracious personality and ability above the ordinary, but
not a superlative leader." Despite his imperfect grasp of "some of the
essentials of the present political situation," he l!eemed to understand "the
nature of the opportunity before him." Yet, even his most ardent ad-
mirers did not claim he was a Wilson or Jefferson.43 One week later the
editor had discovered that "Mr. Roosevelt is about as shrewd a politician
as may be found in either the Republican or Democratic party. And he is
an expert campaigner.... So far he has not made a single blunder.""
On October 4, the Enterprise praised Roosevelt's humanitarianism and his
willingness to be classed as a radical in the tradition of Theodore Roose-
velt and Thomas Jefferson. His conservative critics were not fearful
merely of government competition with private enterprise but that the
government would guarantee "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"
to everyone, instead of just the privileged few. The editor of the Enter-
prise was convinced that the American governmental sy~em could make
this country a better place to live in "without neglecting any of its other
necessary functions, without undergoing any drastic or revolutionary
changes, and without the substitution of paternalism for democracy."·s
The Enterprise's illCl'easing fondness for Roosevelt during the cam-
paign matured into unrestrained admiration when he took office. Com-
menting upon FDR's inauguration, the editor said: "Here was the leader
the nation had been waiting for, a leader who thrust his chin out, became
deadly serious and declared in unequivocal terms that he intended to act
as becomes a leader." It was reassuring to know that the urbane and
charming campaigner could also be a grim and determined warrior..s8 The
Enterprise approved the new President's initial acts, including the bank
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holiday, and urged rapid passage of the Administration's economic meas-
ures by Congress. The free competitive system had broken down. Now,
some new way had to be found to match production with demand, a88Ure
"employment for the maximum number of workers at a wage that will
enable them to consume the maximum output of fa1111s and factories," and,
finally, to provide unemployment insurance and old-age pensions for those
who could not be continuously employed.':
As the New Deal program was presented to Congress the Enterprise
gave its endorsement to one measure after anothH. The federal "blue sky"
law giving the Federal Trade Commission authority to make seculities
sellers publish certain information about stock issues was necessary to pre-
vent the abuses of the past.·8 More stringent federal regulation of all
types of banking was essential for adequate protection of depositors.4 ' The
Enterprise expressed hope for the success of the London Monetary Con-
ference, but .it favored controlled inflation and supported Roosevelt's re-
!usal to bow to the demands of the gold bloc countries. Domestic pros-
perity must be restored before the dollar could be stabilized.~u The Ad-
ministration's transportation bill placing the railroads under a federal
coordinator would eliminate wasteful competition, reduce transportation
costs, and "lay the foundation for permanent reform of the nation's trans-
portation system."51 Though the Enterprise did not strongly endorse the
TVA at the time of its creation, neither did the paper damn it as creeping
f.:ocialism.8I
The Enterprise almost completely reversed itself on agricultural policy
between 1982 and 1988. Far from condemning the New Deal's farm legis-
lation as undue interference with private enterprise, the Beaumont paper
Ilpplauded it as a "daring experim~nt," a "bold remedy" for a desperate
aituation.53 The reduction of cotton production could be accomplished "nat-
urally" if the law of supply and demand were permitted to run its course,
but that would mean the ruin of too many fanners. Long-accepted eco-
nomic theories would have to be scrapped for a while; the federal govern.
ment was the only agency which could achieve the miracle of crop reduc-
tion. The editor had glowing praise for the govE'mment officials, county
agents, and plivate citizens who explained the AAA program to the grow-
ers, and for the Texas fanners who agreed to plow up part of their already
planted cotton crop. If the Roosevelt Administration did nothing
E'lse, the Enterprise declared, it deserved an honol'E'd place in history for
successfully reducing cotton production.s4
The Enterprise heartily endorsed the National Industdal Recovery Act
and urged business and industry to comply with its provisions quickly.
True, the act had been called socialistic and it gavE' unprecedented power
to the President, but it was necessary "to put aside for awhile some of
this nation's most cherished traditions of independent action and individual
initiative" in order to deal effectively with the dep]·ession.~5
The oil industry occupied a particularly important place in the editorial
columns of the Ent~e. In 1931, the paper was critical of the petro-
leum companies who turned to the government for a solution to the mar-
ket glut that was pushing prices lower. The ElIterpn'u: admitted the need
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for proration by the Texas Railroad Commission but vigorously opposed a
graduated gross production tax on petroleum proposed by Governor Miriam
A. Ferguson.$~ However, by the spring of 1933, when oil was selling for
ten cents a barrel in East Texas, the Enterprise was calling for federal
control. The industry should have put its own house in order but it had
failed-as had the state government-to atop overproduction. Now, de-
clared the editor, the Roosevelt Administration would be remiss in its duty
if it did not stabilize the oil industry and prevent. further waste.G1 "The
strong hand of the federal government impowered to prevent interstate
shipments of oil illegally produced is needed to prevent violators of prora-
tion and conservation laws from profiting at the expense of the state and
of oil producers who are trying to obey the law."n The Enterprise ap-
proved of an NRA code for the demoralized petroleum industry which
seemed eager to submit to federal regulation. If Congress passed social-
istic legislation, "the explanation must be sought in industry itself, which
was unable to solve its own problems."G8 The time had come when the na-
tion was no longer interested in quarrels between the major companies and
the independents but in "the conservation of natural resources, an ade-
quate supply of oil, gasoline and other petroleum products at a reasonable
price and stability in one of the nation's greatest industries."8o
The depression as viewed by the Enterprise in 1933 was a great test of
democracy in America. Other countries had turned to totalitarianism and
our own Congress had conferred almost dictatorial powers upon President
Roosevelt. Yet, the paper saw the salvation of democracy in the United
States in exactly the kind of leadership FDR was giVing the nation. He
had not illegally seized power, but was acting with the consent of Congress
and the people.~1 It was no violation of the Constitution for' Congress to
grant the President authority to deal with an emergency. "It is as if a
great fire were raging, Franklin D. Roosevelt is the fire chief; Congress
is the fire department."82 The President had broken the frustrating dead-
lock which was threatening the life of the nation. He had the confidence
of the people and was doing "a masterful job" in securing necessary legis-
lation from Congress.83 At the end of the Hundred Days, the Ente'T'p'l"iae
declared that this session of Congress was WIthout parallel in peacetime--
P..oosevelt had obtained practically everything he asked for. To comfort
those who feared dictatorship, the Enterprise &Ssured its readers that the
President would use his power with restraint. "The American people need
have no fear that they will become wards of the federal government, their
lives regulated, their private affairs controlled by the federal government
and its agents.""
Like democracy, capitalism in America was also on trial in 1933; how-
l::ver, the Enterprise was not certain of ita fate. The capitalistic system
had made the United States rich, but had "prevented an equitable distri-
bution of the wealth created by manipulation of labor and capital."l6 The
depression was largely the result of Republican policy which bad fostered
the concentration of wealth in the hands of an Eastern financial oligarchy
and forced the rest of the people into econlJmic bondage." The United
States, though "still wedded to capitalism," was "clamoring for a more
enlightened form of it" and would no longer "tolerate a &)Tatem incapable
of protecting the many against the aelfish greed of a few." The private
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enterprise system cCl.i.ld survive only if its leaders showed "enough wisdom
lind courage to face new responsibilities" and develop "a social conscious-
ness, conspicuous by its absence from the pre-depression capitalism of the
United States."6T
The Enterprise was not afraid to use the term "socialism" in describing
the New Deal program. Herbert Hoover, "conservative and reactionary,"
had plunged the government into business with the RFC and other meas-
ures; then Roosevelt had carried the nation further down the road to state
&ocialism than any pre-depression observer could have imagined. But,
this was what the people wanted.68 What if Roosevelt's policies were so-
cialistic? The utter failure of traditional methods to end the economic
crisis had forced the President to experiment with new programs. The
American people were fortunate to "have such a man in the White House
" now-a man who is not afraid to make use of socialistic theories, and feels
that he has no alternative but to utilize the powers of government to do
what private initiative is unwilling to do or is incapable of doing." The
Enterprise was certain, however, that Roosevelt would abandon any pro-
gram that did not work and would not push socialism to the point of
creating a "soviet America." Thomas Jefferson's eternal rest would not
be disturbed by the New Deal.6t
At the end of Roosevelt's first Hundred Days, the Beaumont Enterprise
was optimistic about the future. It had learned many lessons from the
depression and changed its stand on a number of issues, particularly those
related to the government's participation in economic life. Indeed, its hope
for the future was based upon vigorous federal participation in areas once
leserved for private enterprise. The Enterprise warmly endorsed the new
society envisioned by New Deal planners. Above all, it wanted no return
to the good old ways of the pre-depression era. It was unthinkable, said
~ an editorial in July, 1933, that the "progress recently made toward. a bet-
ter order of living in America, a more equitable distribution of the wealth
and future insurance against a repetition of current evils will all be thrown
llway, that the United States of 1934-35-36 and subsequent years will be
like the United States of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover."7o
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